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A RATIONAL BASIS FOR AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION: A SHAKY BUT CLASSICAL
LIBERAL DEFENSE
Richard A. Epstein*
I am honored to participate in a symposium on the occasion of the
lOOth anniversary of one of America's preeminent law reviews. I am
saddened, however, to write, at what should be a moment of celebra
tion, with the knowledge that both the Law School and the College of
Literature, Science and the Arts are enmeshed in extensive litigation
over the critical and explosive issue of affirmative action.
To find striking evidence of the deep split of learned judicial views
on this issue, it is necessary to look no further than the sequence of
opinions in Gratz v. Bollinger1 and Grutter v. Bollinger. 2 Gratz was
bought by a rejected white applicant to the College of Literature,
Science and the Arts; Grutter by a rejected white applicant from the
Law School. The two district courts reached opposite conclusions on
what they perceived to be the central issue in this running dialogue:
did the racial diversity of the student body count as a compelling state
interest that justified a departure from the color blind norm estab
lished under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment? Diversity, at the district court level, counted as a com
pelling state interest for the University of Michigan College of
Literature, Science and the Arts, but not for its Law School. This divi
sion of opinion was erased when Grutter was reversed on appeal, most
fittingly, by a bare five to four majority.3 No one seriously thinks that
the matter will rest here, for the tensions within the Sixth Circuit and
beyond make it likely that at long last the Supreme Court will revisit
this issue.
But what approach should be adopted to respond to this question?
It is generally assumed that the legal answer lies in parsing the deci-

* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago;
Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution. A.B. 1964, Columbia;
B.A. (Juris) 1966, Oxford; LL.B. 1968, Yale. - Ed.

1. 122 F. Supp.2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
2. 137 F. Supp.2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001), rev'd 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. May 14, 2002).
3. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002). The case was marked by a sharp
procedural dispute over the propriety of the en bane decision. For the attack on the proce
dure, see Grutter, 288 F.3d at 810-14 (Boggs, J., dissenting), responded to in Grutter, 288 F.3d
at 752-58 (Moore, J., concurring) and Grutter, 288 F.3d 772-73 (Clay, J., concurring). I take
no position on this dispute.
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sions of two key Supreme Court precedents: Regents of University of
California v. Bakke4 and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena. 5 Divining
these precedents offers ample grist for the legal mill, but is no part of
my self-appointed task. Rather, I propose to outline in some detail the
approach that I would take to these questions on the assumption that
the only tools in the toolbox were the bare Constitutional text and a
general appreciation of the Constitution as a classical liberal docu
ment, that is, that emphasizes limited government, strong protection
of property rights and contractual freedoms, coupled with prohibitions
against force and fraud on the one hand, and monopoly power on the
other .6
Many people would assume, wrongly, that this systematic view of
the Constitution leads to an invalidation of all affirmative action pro
grams. But I believe that the sounder implications run in the opposite
direction. Within this framework, I believe that both district courts
and the Sixth Circuit went off the rails when in common they held that
the right question only asks how to apply the strict scrutiny test to the
Michigan affirmative action program. I believe that this is the wrong
standard of judicial review, one which should be abandoned in favor
of a more flexible standard that measures the constitutionality of the
Michigan program by comparing it with the practices done by private,
competitive institutions on a voluntary basis. Using that standard, my
ultimate conclusion is that the University of Michigan, acting on its
own initiative (a qualification that matters), is within its rights under
the Constitution to establish an affirmative action program, however
wise or foolish its decision.
To many individuals that position seems out of character with my
reputation for being "conservative" on various issues of social policy.
But the label "conservative" often elides differences between social
conservatives on the one hand7 and individuals like myself that work
within the classical liberal tradition. Within that tradition, I shall out
line. the set of beliefs that leads me to this conclusion. The path will,
however, both zig and zag. My first order of business is to indicate why
the claims for affirmative action fail under the current law so long as it
requires the state to produce some form of compelling state interest
test to justify affirmative action programs. My second order of busi
ness is to explain how I think that the law should be restructured so as
to permit the use of affirmative action programs in public universities.

4. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
5. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
6. So defended in RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
7. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN
LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE (1996).
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Compelling State Interest
The common theme in all the opinions in Grutter and Gratz is that
the University of Michigan must show a compelling state interest in
order to maintain its affirmative action policies against challenges un
der the equal protection clause. As was stated in Adarand, "all racial
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local govern
mental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scru
tiny. In other words, such classifications are constitutional only if they
are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental
interests."8 In its decision, the majority of the Sixth Circuit added this
gloss to the Adarand test:
[I]n applying strict scrutiny, we cannot ignore the educational judgment
and expertise of the Law School's faculty and admissions personnel re
garding the efficacy of race-neutral alternatives. We are ill-equipped to
ascertain which race-neutral alternatives merit which degree of consid
eration or which alternatives will allow an institution such as the Law
School to assemble both a highly qualified and richly diverse academic
class.9

That clarion-call for deference does not square well with the tradi
tional conception of strict scrutiny. But the majority of the Sixth
Circuit undoubtedly added that gloss because it could not unilaterally
overturn the strict scrutiny standard in Adarand. In one sense, that
tactical judgment was surely correct, for no matter what one thinks of
the desirability of affirmative action programs, one conclusion seems
clear. Under its traditional rendering, the strict scrutiny standard
dooms the race-sensitive programs of the University of Michigan .
The first point is that the University of Michigan does, for better or
worse, take race into account in an explicit fashion in making its ad
missions decisions. The statistical evidence of racial preferences of
fered by the plaintiff's expert, Dr. Kinley Larntz, in Grutter centered
on the "relative odds of acceptance" for members of each racial group.
The technique is simplicity itself. All that is needed is to divide the ap
plicants of all races into various cells, measured by their common
grades and board scores. One then compares the probabilities of ad
mission for members of the different groups. These differences are too
large and too persistent to be obtained by chance. Judge Friedman
found, for example, that "[i]n 1995, the relative odds of acceptance
were 61.37 for Native Americans, 257.93 for African Americans, 81.90
for Mexican Americans, and 37.86 for Puerto Ricans."10 Judge

8. 515 U.S. at 227.
9. Grutter, 288 F.3d at 750-51.

10.

Grutter,

137 F. Supp.2d at 837 n.20.
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Friedman rightly dispatched the statistical evidence that Dr. Gerald
Raudenbush offered for the University of Michigan in short order.11
The Michigan programs (like those of virtually every other public
university) thus deviate from the prima facie color-blind constitutional
norm. The only question left to argue is that of justification. On this
score, conventional wisdom rightly divides the purported justifications
into two classes. The first of these holds that race sensitive programs
can be used to provide remedies to particular and identifiable indi
viduals who had been victims of discrimination wrought by the defen
dant institution at some earlier time. The clear effort here is to appeal
to some implicit notion of Aristotelian corrective justice under which
the individuals to whom the relief is extended are the same persons
who were wronged by the system in the first place.12
That rationale, however, has a built-in time fuse that makes it a
wasting asset in equal protection (or other race-based constitutional)
litigation. The last use of official discrimination in the United States
ended thirty-eight years ago; the vestiges of that discrimination may
well have lingered on a bit longer. But these remedial claims by defini
tion get weaker with each passing year even in those states that prac
ticed some form of racial segregation or exclusion.13 But Michigan was
not one of those places, and no amount of self-slander could make it
so. Unless the University of Michigan can wrap itself in past sins that it
did not commit, this backward looking rationale is dead on arrival.
There is no need to discuss it further.
The forward looking rational takes a different tack: diversity.14 The
argument in a word is that the educational experience is better for all
concerned if students are exposed to students who are drawn from all
walks of life. It is just this line of argument that the University ad
vanced with unitary passion on its behalf.15 According to its expert
witness, Dr. Pamela Gurin, an educational program that has few, if
any, black or other minority students in it offers a weaker education
for the white as well as the other minority students in the program.16
Diversity is not tied to past sins, so it is not a wasting asset. But for
11.

Id.

at 839.

12. See ARISTOT LE, THE NICOMACHEAN ET H ICS, Book V, 113lb-25
Rackham trans., Harvard University Press reprint ed. 1982).

et seq.

(H.

13. For my views on this in connection with litigation on local school districts, see
Richard A. Epstein, The Remote Causes of Affirmative Action, Or School Desegregation in
Kansas City, Missouri, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1101 (1996), discussing Missouri v. Jenkins, 510 U.S.
70 (1995).
14. For discussion, see, for example, Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1986
Term - Comment: Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 78 (1986).
15. Grutter, 137 F. Supp.2d. at 825-36; Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp.2d 811, 822 (E.D.
Mich. 2000).
16.

Gratz, 122 F.

Supp.2d. at 822-23.
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some purposes diversity is a trope that may sweep too broadly, for it
allows, indeed requires, the accommodation of all minority groups, not
just blacks who have nationwide suffered the stain of slavery and past
discrimination. But even if it is restricted to blacks only, and even if
the social science is treated as solid, the evidence presented does not
come close to being the required compelling state interest, at least un
der any neutral standard that treats discrimination against whites with
the same earnest apprehension as it does discrimination against
blacks. By way of comparison, think of how difficult it is today under
Title VII for any employer to show that he has a bona fide interest in
discriminating on the grounds of sex or national origin.17 The statute
did not even consider the possibility that such a justification could be
offered on reasons of race.18 The original legislative history to Title
VII may have provided that it is permissible for French restaurants to
hire French chefs,19 but the case law under Title VII has been un
relenting insofar as it has required a strict proof of business necessity
to sustain any explicit sex classification.20 It is difficult, for example, to
argue that states should have only female guards in female prisons.21
The argument is that differences in sex are not to be tolerated unless
the heavens will fall.
Racial classifications are, if anything, more difficult to justify. Title
VII hints at that difference because it contains no bona fide occupa
tional qualification ("BFOQ") for race. Here, moreover, the heavens
will not fall even if every program of race-based preferences were re
pealed tomorrow. Start with the most obvious point: Students of mi
nority groups may be forceful and eloquent spokesmen for their own
racial views. But so what? There are many academic courses in which
the questions of race and sex are marginal at best. In the arts and sci
ences, none of the math and science curriculum has a racial message;
the same is true of large portions of social sciences and the humanities
as well. Within the law school, tax, business, and procedural courses
have little if any content related to race, and it would be odd to say
that they could not be taught successfully without any reference to
race, or indeed without any minority or female students. After all,

17. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(e), codified in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994) (allow
ing bona fide occupational qualifications for religion, sex and national origin). For my views,
see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 283-312 (1992) (hereinafter EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS).
18.

Id.

(race not on list).

19. As stated in the Clark-Case memorandum in support of the Civil Rights Act. 110
CONG. REC. 7213 (1964).
20.

See, e.g.,

Int'! Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991).

21. See, e.g., Torres v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health and Social Servs., 838 F.2d 944 (7th
Cir. 1988) (rejecting practice), overturned en bane, 859 F.2d 1523 (7th Cir. 1988) (reversing
decision below).
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many of the lawyers and professors who teach today received excel
lent education in these subjects before the advent of any affirmative
action program.
Of course other courses have greater racial content. Colleges of
Arts and Sciences do teach extensive programs in Black Studies, and
much of the humanities and social science curriculum does revolve
around the issue of race. Similarly in law school, many courses, such as
criminal procedure, civil rights, constitutional law, and employment
discrimination positively invite some distinctive racial point of view.
But once again, where is the compelling state interest? It would be
odd to think that minority outlooks represent some monolithic front
organized by race. We should expect a divergence of opinion both
within and across racial groups. The members of a particular racial
group never hold a de facto monopoly on any matter of public debate.
It is, to say the least, highly improbable that all the white students in a
large class are so ignorant of race relations that they are unable to
comprehend the worries and aspirations of minority group members.
Indeed, to insist that they cannot express this point of view suggests
ominously that they cannot internalize that point of view either, even
when from members of minority groups. But if that is the case, then
diversity can hardly count as a compelling state interest if it consis
tently fails to teach white students enough so that they can impart
what they learn to others.
Fortunately, this observation is wishful thinking. In the pre-1964
era, the entire civil rights movement succeeded only because large
numbers of white people, many of whom were raised in segregated
circumstances, backed the movement with their hearts and souls, and
in some cases their lives. Although not minority members, these
people can relate their own experiences, and even if they cannot, it is
easy to assign readings, or invite guest lecturers to express the black
point of view. I do not claim that the use of any of these approaches
works as well as a program that has a minimum minority representa
tion in each class. But it is wholly unnecessary at this point to under
take that battle. The question here is not whether education works
better with diversity, on which people can, of course, disagree. It is
whether the state has a compelling interest in that direction. A com
pelling state interest is one that says we should rely on racial classifica
tions to prevent race riots. No way, at least not under any two-way,
color-blind standard articulated in Adarand.
The color-blind standard, if conscientiously applied, cuts even
deeper. One effort to deal with the demands for affirmative action af
ter the Fifth Circuit's decision in Hopwood v. State of Texas,22 which
struck down the affirmative action program in Texas universities, is

22. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
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illustrative. In order to maintain black enrollment in Texas universi
ties, Texas adopted a system whereby automatic admission was guar
anteed on a color-blind basis to the top ten percent of each graduating
class of each Texas high school. The program was color-blind in form,
but its explicit intention was to maintain the levels of enrollments of
minority students. The program was, in Glenn Loury's terms, color
blind but not color indifferent .23 The point here is to avoid the visible
sting associated with explicit racial categories while obtaining as much
of the preferred race-distribution as possible, given that the top ten
percent of an all-black high school for example has to be by definition
black, no matter what the qualifications of the students in that top
decile.
There are forceful objections to the use of this race-blind (but not
race indifferent) system as a matter of policy. Oftentimes black stu
dents with lower class standing from rigorous urban schools have su
perior academic credentials to black students who graduate at the top
of smaller and less rigorous high schools . In principle, a sensible af
firmative action program should take the strongest African-American
students, a result that can only be achieved by the use of race
conscious standards. Texas's new practice just illustrates the old
maxim of Karl Llewellyn that covert tools are bad tools. But for these
purposes, pass those difficulties by, for this formal system of race
neutrality has to count as an open-and-shut evasion of a strict scrutiny
test, precisely because of its hidden racial agenda. The civil rights laws
knew of the dangers of neutral laws with disparate impact. The old
grandfather laws were efforts to stymie black participation in the po
litical process by denying the vote to anyone whose grandfather was
not eligible to vote in, of course, the antebellum South. If one point
was made repeatedly clear in the framing of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, it was that the federal statute would offer but a puny barricade
to racial discrimination if it only attacked explicit racial classifications
while enforcing neutral classifications adopted with the specific motive
of keeping blacks out of certain positions.24 Indeed, even the use of
motive-based tests was adjudged insufficient for that purpose, so that
by 1971 the United States Supreme Court held that any employment
practice done without racial motive could be attacked under Title VII
so long as it had a disparate impact, unless that result could be justi
fied by some narrow conception of business necessity.25
The ten percent rule is, of course, adopted with the explicit racial
motive of maximizing black enrollments at the university level. If
23. GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 133 (2002).
24. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (setting out the
various disparate treatment tests to smoke out cases in which neutral language was a pretext
for discriminatory outcomes).
25. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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Adarand means what it says in holding that strict scrutiny applies both
ways, then this program that rejects racial indifference should be con
demned as vigorously as a literacy test or a grandfather clause that is
designed to keep black voters from the polls. Under strict scrutiny, fa
cially neutral statutes and programs fall instantly to equal protection
challenges when they are motivated by an explicit desire to favor
whites over blacks. There is some dubious authority that extends the
prohibition even to statutes whose intention is to restore or validate
the common law rules that allow all property owners (common carri
ers excepted) to decide whom to deal with and whom not.26 We cannot
just forget these doctrinal byways if we believe in strict scrutiny for all
race-based challenges. Let the games be played under the current con
stitutional rules, and affirmative action is history.
This view should come as no surprise to anyone who has glanced at
the interpretive history of the clause. We can find only one case that
sustained government action under this framework, Korematsu v.
United States,27 which upheld the Japanese internment during World
War II, even after all risk of a Japanese invasion of the West Coast
had long passed. Surely that case offers cold comfort for the defenders
of affirmative action: indeed government victories serve to remind us
that strict scrutiny really does have some irreducible place in any
sound analysis of equal protection. But for these purposes Korematsu
is the dubious exception, not the general rule. Before the recent round
of affirmative action cases the Supreme Court adhered to the famous
formulation of Professor Gerald Gunther who observed that this stan
dard was "strict" in theory, but "fatal" in fact.28 Fairly apply strict scru
tiny and Michigan's affirmative action program is as dead as a door
nail . True, but wholly unacceptable. We have to begin afresh.
.•

Rethinking the Constitutional Standard: Symmetry?
The only question worth asking is, in my view, how to dislodge this
strict scrutiny test in these affirmative action battles, without neces
sarily jettisoning it in any and all contexts to which it might apply. In
order to do that we have to recall how and why the test developed in
the first place. As a matter of doctrinal convention, the strict scrutiny
test lies at the opposite pole from the badly misnamed "rational basis"
test, under which the level of deference accorded to the legislature is

26. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
27. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
28. Gerald Gunther,

The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1,

8 (1972).
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so vast that any bad argument asserted with a straight face prevails.29
One might say that the test is "rational" in theory and "permissive" in
fact. No legal system, of course, could operate only at these two ex
tremes, so a test of intermediate scrutiny has insinuated its way into
the mix in equal protection law, as elsewhere. Our Constitution has an
embarrassment of riches: a standard of review for every pocketbook
and taste.
Focusing for the moment at the extremes, what accounts for the
spread of judicial sentiment to multiple challenges under the same
clause? What factors could prompt the Supreme Court to take such a
radically different attitude to different forms of legislation under the
same constitutional provision? Obviously, no simple textual answer
will explain the migration to two extremes simultaneously. Some
structural or functional explanation has to be added to the mix. That
explanation has both a procedural, or at least process-based, and a
substantive component. Thus the first key variable is the level of trust
that the Court perceives as appropriate for the political branches of
government in any given context. The second variable is whether the
Court is able to form its own considered view of whether the laws in
question make sense on substantive grounds.
The rational basis test is used when that level of trust is high, and
the Court has no strong conviction one way or the other on the sub
stantive merits of the laws before them. It is unfortunate that the
Supreme Court overlearned from the "mistake" of Lochner v. New
York30 in holding that virtually all general legislation directed to eco
nomic affairs lies outside the scope of judicial review, not only under
the equal protection clause, but just about everywhere else as well.
Whether the issue was substantive due process or takings, or even
matters relating to the scope of the commerce clause, the Court gravi
tated toward the rational basis test because it held, and still holds, the
perception that the political branches of government, both state and
federal, can effectively deal with the economic issues that challenge
the nation. It has no strong views as to what counts as sound economic
policy. In an earlier age, such questions as the choice between monop
oly and competition had merited judicial intervention in favor of the
later.31 The welter of New Deal experiments championed monopolies
in some cases (as agricultural policy, such as that sustained in United

29. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Ry. Express Agency v. New
York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (upholding restrictions on advertising under due process).
30. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
31. See, for example, the cases striking down wage and price regulations in those indus
tries not "affected with the public interest." See, e.g., Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus.
Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923) (effectively overruled in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502
(1934) (sustaining minimum prices for milk)); United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S.
81 (1921).
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States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co.32 and Wickard v. Filburn33) and com
petition in others (as with vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws),
except of course against state sponsored cartels.34 In principle, national
legislation veered strongly for and strongly against competition simul
taneously. Only the legislature could sort through the confusion after
all the relevant interest groups had participated in the legislative proc
ess, where they could protect themselves against various forms of po
litical risk.35 The standard of rational basis review was thus borne of
two parallel considerations. First, the Court no longer had any sub
stantive view of what counts as good legislation on economic matters.
Second, the Court thought that an open political system gave the vari
ous actors all the process protection needed to avert unacceptable
outcomes. The revolution of 1937 cemented this synthesis into place.
Yet this happy state of affairs was not to last. Just as the Court
went into rapid retreat on economic issues, questions of race surged to
the fore. In these cases, both the assumptions propping up the rational
basis test collapse, and the famous footnote 4 in the Carotene Products
decision immediately reinstituted a higher standard of review in favor
of discrete and insular minorities,36 a code phrase, which at a minimum
included black citizens in the South. Any claim that all relevant parties
could protect their interests through the political process was patently
false for a disenfranchised black minority. So overcoming its shaky
start with the first white primary cases,37 the Court's basic attitude
quickly shifted to using strict scrutiny to test legislation on matters of
race. The Court did not have to engage in complex economic calcula
tions to determine the evils of segregation and Jim Crow. It also rec
ognized that the political process was rigged to frustrate the redress of
individual and group grievances. Those perceptions thus drove the
Court to demand the most compelling justifications of any restriction
on individual liberties based on race. As with the rational basis test,
the overall attitude spoke volumes. The peculiar features of each spe
cific constitutional clause counted for relatively little. Tough scrutiny
with race cases was rightly the order of the day.
One of the great ironies with the modern statement of strict scru
tiny is that it erects a color-blind norm that runs in both directions,
such that under its relentless Adarand formulation any claim brought

32. 315 U.S. 110 (1942).
33. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
34.

See, e.g.,

Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).

35. See Richard Stewart,
L. REV. 1669 (1975).

The Reformation of American Administrative Law,

88 HARV.

36. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53, n.4 (1938).
37. See, e.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (invalidating white primary);
Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935) (sustaining white primary).
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by a white person against state action should be judged by the same
exacting standards as any claim brought by a black person against
state action. Clearly, there has been an enormous shift in political in
stitutions and political behavior since the end of the Second World
War, indeed, even since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
But with all the advances in the protection of minority interests, with
all the trumpeting of a new generation of explicit racial preferences,
no one could say, or at least say honestly, that whites today are ex
cluded from the political process as blacks had been under segrega
tion; nor, in light of an oft-painful racial history, is it possible to sub
ject raced-based polices that benefit blacks to the same full-throated
denunciation as could be brought against state-sponsored segregation.
To be sure, some people do believe that the color-blind principle op
erates as a categorical imperative good for all ages. They can insist
that the principle that first reared its head in Justice Harlan's classic
dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,38 showed its value in the war against seg
regation, and could do every bit as much good in rooting out affirma
tive action programs. But such fervor is sadly misplaced: the simple
truth is that the division of learned and responsible opinion makes it
impossible to denounce affirmative action as the second-coming of Jim
Crow. It is always open, in a popular if not a constitutional sense, to
argue that affirmative action should be a response to the prior evils of
segregation. It is hard to find some prior historical practice that could
be invoked as the justification for Jim Crow segregation.

Toward Rational Basis Review
We thus arrive at an unhappy impasse. If we hew to traditional
constitutional law doctrine, then we must jettison affirmative action
notwithstanding its widespread support in the university and business
communities.39 Their political position does not represent solely some
high sense of social purpose. It also represents a strong instinct for in
stitutional survival. The disparate impact tests used under Griggs re
present that extravagant overextension of Title VII, which itself
should be repealed. Businesses know that it is possible to live with
Griggs, albeit not cheaply, solely because there is so little private insti38. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
39. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F.2d 811, 822 n.11 (E.D. Mich. 2000). See also the
corporations: General Motors, Abbott Laboratories, Bank One Corp., E.I. Dupont de Ne
mours Co., Dow Chemical Co., Eastman Kodak Col., General Mills, Inc. Intel Corp., John
son and Johnson, Kellogg Co., KMPG Int'!, Lucent Technologies, Inc. Microsoft Corp., PPG
Industries, Inc., Procter and Gamble Co., Sara Lee, Crop., Texaco, Inc., TRW, Inc. Id. at
813. See also, the ExxonMobil advertisement in the New York Times, March 7, 2002, at A31,
"Laborious indeed at the first ascent," whose insert proclaims "Business support for women
and minorities is growing." The ad is one of a series that proclaims all the race and sex-based
programs that business supports, and praises per se violations of the color-blind, sex-blind
standards of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
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tutional sentiment in favor of reverse discrimination in the first place.
But the systematic extension of Griggs under a rigorous both-ways
standard not only means the end of every affirmative action program
in the private sector, but also a ceaseless round of suits any time the
composition of the workforce deviates from Griggs's insanely tight re
quirements of proportionate representation. Businesses and universi
ties have little patience with the aesthetic niceties of perfect symmetry
under a high standard. What they crave is freedom to enact the poli
cies that they care about, and toward that end they get far more run
ning room in a world in which Griggs becomes a one-way test and
courts acquiesce in most if not all affirmative action practices.
The same political calculations carry over to the equal protection
clause. What is desired by these businesses and universities under the
equal protection clause is the same partial dispensation from the legal
straightjacket. Strong norms that ban racial discrimination against
blacks are acceptable in principle, but the both-ways test is every bit as
suicidal for American public institutions as the both-ways tests under
Griggs are for private firms and universities. Clearly, something is very
odd about judicial intrusion into the oversight of affirmative action,
for no one believes, on or off the courts, that the factual predicates
that justified strict scrutiny for legislation directed against disadvan
taged black citizens applies with equal force to legislation in favor of
disadvantaged black citizens. We do not have disenfranchised white
voters; we do not have white-only fountains, nor racial policies that
stink at the nostrils.

Back to First Principles, Briefly
The question then is, how we can translate that simple insight
about social differences, grasped by every administrator public and
private, into sensible constitutional doctrine? I think that we should
take our cue from the judgment and practices of our private institu
tions, most of which are committed to some level (but not necessarily
the same level) of affirmative action in their daily operations. The ar
gument requires us to attack some powerful mainstays of the modern
civil rights movement, but since I have already sacrificed any and all
claim to public office, I shall state the argument against the current
status quo as best I can as a matter of first principle.40
The discussion starts with the relationship of the individual to the
state. That question resists a frontal assault by the tools of public law
alone. Instead we must proceed by indirection. We must first develop

40. For fuller statements of my position, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A
FREE SOCIETY: RECONCILING INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY WITH THE COMMON GOOD (1998),
and RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995). I shall not
document the details of the argument here.
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a comprehensive theory that explains the relationship between ordi
nary individuals. That theory then supplies us with the needed base
line to understand the relationship between the individual and the
state. How then do individuals relate to each other? In standard politi
cal theory, the original position in the state of nature offers scant com
fort. Before law, each may do what he pleases to any other person,
who in turn is free to respond in the same way. Some writers in the
Hobbesian tradition call this unbounded self as the exercise of a natu
ral liberty, but other writers distinguish sharply between liberty and
license, and reserve the term natural liberty to refer to conduct that
does more than fear retaliation by others, but respects their individual
rights.
These ultimate descriptive differences about the state of nature are
important for the history of ideas, but they should not conceal the es
sential point. The utter absence of any legal order precludes any ar
ticulated rights and duties that bind individuals to each other. Brute
strength coupled with cunning determines how people interact with
each other. The evident inconveniences of this social position have
impressed themselves on all social contract theorists from Hobbes to
Locke to Hume and Smith. Each writer in his own way concludes that
the creation of a social order (or contract) requires all individuals to
renounce the use of force (and fraud) against each other and the state
to have enough power to make good the promises of the new legal
order. Once that is done, then each is better off, for the security that
he obtains is worth more than the liberties that he surrenders. Hence
the first step of political theory is to postulate a series of universal
rights whose correlative duties are to keep off. These duties benefit all
and they bind all. They are imposed by law because of the manifest in
ability to achieve them by unanimous contract.
The next inquiry is whether we can conceptualize any further im
provement in social arrangements from this new baseline. At least one
move is easy to make. The renunciation of force allows people to keep
what they have, but does not allow them to acquire anything through
voluntary exchange: contracts, conveyances, gifts, mortgages, partner
ships and the like are not part of the grand plan. But the introduction
of a system of free exchange allows for gains from trade, which when
applied systematically (that is over the full range of transactions)
create vast improvements over the previous state of the world as well.
Exchange is thus added to security. To that, we can add to the list of
sensible state functions by allowing government to maintain the key
network elements, such as roads and other network industries: again
state power allows a social group to obtain output that cannot in prac
tice be reached solely by voluntary combination.
The system reads like a wish list at this point because it makes no
financial provision for the collective enforcement of these rights, and
thus apparently relies on allowing each person to use self-help in the
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state of nature. The self-help system is so contaminated with bias and
uncertainty that its drawbacks require little elaboration. Clearly, we
can achieve an additional round of improvements by allowing for a
system of (proportionate) taxation that supplies the funds to provide
both the internal enforcement of these rights to liberty, property and
contract, and protection against external enemies who might otherwise
undermine the whole system.41 The implicit corollary is that all citizens
have an equal right to participate in determining the way in which
those funds were spent on these collective functions. In four easy steps
we reach the core principles of limited government.42
The question that one has to ask is what place does this system
have for an antidiscrimination law that stipulates the grounds on
which it is proper (or not proper) to do business with others.43 The
answer is, I believe, that a nondiscrimination principle is a powerful
antidote to the abuses of government and private power, where either
is blessed with monopoly power over certain areas of human life. Such
is the case when the state supplies protection to its citizens or essential
services that cannot be obtained from other sources. The impartial
administration of the rules of civil and criminal liability is indispens
able protection for any system of ordered liberty. It is just for that rea
son that the first Justice Harlan struck a powerful chord when he ap
pealed to the color-blind principle as a means to equalize legal posi
tion in the face of evident social equality.44 His object was to make

41. See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 777 (Mod. Lib. Ed. 1937) ("The
subjects of every state ought to contribute toward the support of the government, as nearly
as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue
which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state.").

42. On this point, Adam Smith is most instructive:
According to the system of natural liberty, the sovereign has only three duties to attend
to: . . . . first the duty of protecting the society from the violence an invasion of other inde
pendent societies; secondly, the duty of protecting as far as possible every member of the so
ciety from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it, or the duty of establishing
an exact administration of justice; and, thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain
public works and certain public institutions, which it can never be for the interest of any in
dividual, or small number of individuals to erect and maintain.
at 651.
That this position does not contemplate the regulation of labor markets is seen by
Smith's earlier observation:
Id.

[T]he obvious and simple system of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord. Every
man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own
interest in his own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with
those of any other man, or order of men.
Id.

43. Again, for the fuller elaboration, see EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS,

supra

note

17.
44. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting):

The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in prestige,
in achievements, in education, in wealth, and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be
for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitu-
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sure that the state did not use its dominant power to advance the in
terest of one group over another. We do a great disservice to his
memory by overlooking that noble cause.
Thus far I have noted the close analytical connection between the
antidiscrimination norm and the presence of monopoly power. The
former should be used as an effort to limit the state as well as private
use of monopoly power. On this view, however, the antidiscrimination
principle has no role to play to the extent that it is invoked to limit the
ordinary principle of freedom of association as it applies to those pri
vate individuals and firms that do not possess any monopoly power at
all. We need to invoke the antidiscrimination principle against the
monopolist to protect customers of essential facilities and services,
such as the hub of a railroad network, who otherwise have no other
place to go.45 But once any individual or institution is stripped of that
monopoly power, then everyone else finds their strongest protection
in the power to go elsewhere if they do not like the terms and condi
tions on which any one provider chooses to offer some goods or serv
ices. Free entry thus becomes the low-cost antidote to discrimination
and abuse in competitive settings.
This analysis has powerful implications for the use and reach of the
color-blind principle. That principle which is used to prevent the crea
tion of explicit political castes in a constitutional order should yield to
the principle of freedom of association once the vestiges of monopoly
power have been removed from the playing field. At this point we can
see the great structural mistake of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 insofar
as it sought to regulate employment and educational opportunities. It
demanded that the same color-blind principle that applies to the state
in its role of the enforcer of private rights and the operator of social
infrastructure be used to regulate the decisions of private actors in
competitive markets. In so doing, it injected a new and gratuitous ele
ment of monopoly power - the insistence that all private employment
contracts abide by a single set of rules dictated by the state. When that
statute was passed, most of its supporters made the confident empiri
cal judgment that the consistent application of the nondiscrimination
principle in employment and education would lead to an elimination
of serious racial differences in the distribution of income and attain
ment. For whatever reason, it turns out that they were wrong. It was
only a matter of a short time until the dominant consensus shifted
away from the two-sided nondiscrimination principle in favor of a rule
that maintained the hard-edge against discrimination in one direction
- against blacks and other racial minorities - while extolling the vir-

tional liberty. But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country
no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our constitution is
color-blind.

45.

See, e.g., United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S.

383 (1912).
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tues of voluntary affirmative action in the other. In effect, one-half the
Civil Rights Act was repealed by the artful construction given to Title
VII, which allowed discrimination toward some but not toward others.
The great error was that neither the courts nor the legislature were
prepared to finish the job and to recognize that for ordinary private
individuals and associations, the freedom of association principle
should dominate the color-blind principle rightly invoked by Harlan in
Plessy. The benefits of that principle can be quickly restated. The level
of public coercion is minimized as individuals are allowed to form
those contracts and associations that maximize their joint benefits.
They have greater information about who they are and what they want
than any legislature or any court, and thus can work out the elaborate
personal and institutional arrangements that depend critically on the
accumulation of that knowledge. Where the two parties do not agree,
then the law provides both with a clear fallback position: each can
refuse to deal with the other. Any two people who do form a mini
association presumptively have it within their power to decide who
else gets admitted into their group and who is excluded. The absolute
refusal to deal is allowed, indeed encouraged, because other individu
als and other groups can fill the social spaces left empty when one
group, wisely or stubbornly, follows a policy of exclusion.
So long as the critical ingredient of monopoly power is missing, it
hardly matters what the grounds of inclusion and exclusion are. The
chess club can exclude checkers players; it does not have to allow into
membership anyone who plays board games. So it is that Jews and
blacks and Christians and Muslims can all form their own groups, be it
for religious, social or political purposes. One nice feature of this sys
tem is that it allows for all individuals to assume overlapping identities
by taking on multiple memberships. I can be the member of a Jewish
only synagogue, a sports league open to men only, and an eating club
open to all comers. The synagogue can invite non-Jews to participate
in its athletic programs and after-school activities, but not in its relig
ious instruction. The dense network of crossovers does not respond to
any central plan, but emerges by successive interactions of ordinary
people. In this milieu, the norm of freedom of association dominates
because any effort to have the state decide the grounds on which
people may not (or must) be admitted to organizations enlarges the
very risk of monopoly power that makes government action so peril
ous in the first place.
This principle is, moreover, wholly consistent with the constitu
tional ideal of equal protection of the laws, because it does not work
differentially to the advantage of any one racial or religious group.
Thus a full-throated endorsement of this principle makes it impossible
for any state to exclude those groups who want to admit everyone, re
gardless of race, creed or religion, except members of the Ku Klux
Klan. The entire course of segregation in the Old South, especially its
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totalitarian excesses, would have been vastly different if segregationist
governments had been prepared or required to extend full and equal
legal protection to voluntary integrated organizations as they did to
segregated ones. The change in local governance would have altered
the patterns of entry and exit into the region. The arrival of new
people would lead to further changes in political composition of the
electorate, and in the long run to the transformation of its ordinary
politics. These changes in turn would have led to a major amelioration
of social tensions, even if some white southerners had adamantly
sought to preserve in their private relations only the traditions of seg
regation. One controversial conclusion from this position is that the
antidiscrimination laws have been extended beyond their proper
sphere when used to regulate the behavior of individuals and firms in
private competitive markets. To my mind, they are (or at least should
be) unconstitutional insofar as they are applied to private voluntary
organizations.

Affirmative Action, At Last
This conclusion is well beyond our comfortable mainstream, and
doubtless will offend many. Nonetheless, it offers the ray of hope in
sustaining affirmative action and undoing the social mischief that I be
lieve will surely follow if the University of Michigan and other public
and private universities are forced by a dubious reading of the equal
protection clause into the Procrustean Bed whereby none of them can
adopt affirmative action programs. If my analysis is correct, then it ex
plains why the correct interpretation of the color-blind norm prevents
the use of official favoritism without, at the same time, touching mat
ters of private associational choice. Today we do live in an age of iden
tity politics. Indeed for much of our history we have had identity
based social movements.46 It seems odd beyond all imagination to be
lieve first in the durability and the legitimacy of these movements,
only to turn around and conclude that their sole permissible political
objective is to secure color-blind rules in circumstances when the ap
plication of color-based rules work to their disadvantage. A far more
respectful reading of that tradition is to reaffirm the private/public line
and to argue that all groups, regardless of their composition, have
equal rights under law, including enjoyment of the full rights of asso
ciation - precisely because they enjoy the equal protection of the
laws (and of course liberty of contract under the due process clause as
well).

46. For discussion, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social
Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002)
(this issue).
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Those rights of association, I repeat, are not only rights of exclu
sion. They are also rights of inclusion. In the modern setting, we know
how many individuals choose to exercise their rights. In one sense, the
Supreme Court beat a hasty retreat from a badly overgeneralized
color-blind norm when, in United Steelworks v. Weber,47 the Court al
lowed private firms, unions and associations to engage in discrimina
tion that favors African-Americans and other minority groups. How
ever much one may question their wisdom, no one can deny the
power, durability and direction of these associational choices. Can
anyone name a single institution (other, perhaps, than once all black
institutions) that announces a race-based policy against blacks? No.
The quick but cynical reply says that this pattern can only be treated
as a beneficent consequence of the Civil Rights Act that makes such
discrimination illegal. My reaction is exactly the opposite. The moral
case for affirmative action is weakened, not strengthened, by the pub
lic prohibitions against private discrimination against blacks. That le
gal barrier makes it all too easy for cynics to argue that the widespread
support for affirmative action is simply a clever ploy to reduce the
odds being held liable under the Civil Rights Act.
Yet the truth is otherwise. I have no question that tomorrow's re
peal of the Civil Rights Acts would not result in the end of affirmative
action programs. The current practices cannot be explained as a clever
strategy to escape liability. Were that the case, then private institu
tions would edge as close of the line as they could without being
caught. But the dominant reality is otherwise. The level of affirmative
action in the United States in the private sector on grounds of race
goes far beyond what is needed to keep firms out of hot water. It re
presents a sustained and consistent effort to change the dominant
practices in the United States. It is often said that narrow and atomis
tic accounts of human nature fail to explain complex problems of so
cial organization. Glenn Loury pushes hard on that point when he at
tacks the traditional rights-based theories of contractual freedom
associated with Robert Nozick.48 Yet at no point does he, or others
like him, return to the original rhetoric in support of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, where the constant theme was that disembodied merit
should be the exclusive criterion on which employment (and similar

47. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
48. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA
supra note 23, at 128, 212 n.5 (2002). The gist of that criticism is

(1974), criticized in LOURY,
that the theory does not ex
plain what should be done when the transfer of resources in society does not follow the pre
scribed rules, which in Nozick's case are the rules of original acquisition by capture followed
by voluntary transfer thereafter - yet another variation on Smith's system of natural liberty.
But no theory works well with restitution from admitted wrongs, especially those from sys
temic social causes. For different views on this subject, see Orlando Patterson, Beyond
Compassion, DAEDALUS, Winter 2002, at 26, and Richard A. Epstein, Against Redress,
DAEDALUS, Winter 2002, at 39.
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decisions) were made. As Hubert Humphrey stated: "In Title VII we
seek to prevent discriminatory hiring practices. We seek to give people
an opportunity to be hired on the basis of merit, and to release the
tremendous talents of the American people, rather than to keep their
talents buried under prejudice or discrimination."49 The statute thus
did not appreciate the importance that the full range of personal char
acteristics has for the effective operation of voluntary markets, and
thus has created a caricature of hiring standards that dogs the opera
tion of labor markets to this day. The civil rights establishment, so
keenly attuned to the dangers of Jim Crow, was blind to the long-term
effects of Title VII. Loury and others should direct their fire against
the civil rights establishment and not the market libertarians, who
avoid the mistake of limiting employment decisions behind some pub
lic standard of merit.so
It is not just black intellectuals and libertarians who get the point.
Many white people hold the same views with passionate intensity. The
level of affirmative action in the United States is not explainable by
pressure from minority groups alone. They are too weak to do the job.
White support for these programs is needed to explain the variegated
responses to the use of affirmative action in the United States.
This combination of past history and present practice gives us the
vital clue as to the proper role of government with respect to the af
firmative action challenge. The public/private distinction of classical
liberal theory has become blurred because governments today do
more than classical liberals like myself think appropriate. One of the
things that states do, which probably they should not do, is run great
universities. But here is not the place to argue for the privatization of
state universities.s1 Nor is it any part of my agenda to invoke the color
blind standard as a backhanded effort to induce state universities to
privatize. Rather I shall undertake only the more limited task of de
termining how the state should be judged when it steps beyond its tra
ditional nightwatchman's role and undertakes the kinds of enterprises
that are also taken by private institutions in competitive markets. Here
we must inescapably make judgments about the operation of a second
best world. Ultimately the question is one of resemblance. Do public
universities and their kindred institutions look more like private insti
tutions that supply the same sorts of educational services, or do they
look more like the arms of the system of law enforcement?

49. 110 CONG. REC. 6548 (1964).
50. For my views, on the point, see Epstein, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 17, at
163-65.
51. Adam Smith may have been a bit harsh when he wrote: "Were there no public insti
tutions for education, no system, no science would be taught for which there was not some
demand; or which the circumstances of the times did not render it either necessary, or con
venient, or at least fashionable, to learn." SMITH, supra note 41, at 733.

August 2002]

Rational Basis for Affirmative Action

2055

In my view, the answer to that question is clear: the private anal
ogy wins, hands down. State universities receive some public funds,
and are subject to too much direct legislative control. But they charge
tuition for the students who they enroll, and they pay salaries to the
faculty and administrators that they hire. In both settings they operate
in intensely competitive markets, where the competition comes from a
wide array of private institutions, from state institutions within the
state, and from state institutions of other states.
That context matters. No one to my knowledge thinks that a de
mand for an affirmative action program is even intelligible when the
state operates in its law enforcement capacity. No one claims that an
affirmative action law should allow black individuals to escape on
grounds of race punishment for actions that expose white individuals
to charges of murder. No one thinks that the punishment to all blacks
should be 1 . 2 or 0.8 times the same punishment for whites for the same
offense under the same circumstances. Even if we think that race
conscious decisions should be used in hiring and assigning members of
the police force - and in many cases we do - the goal is always to se
cure all individuals the equal protection of the laws, with the emphasis
evenly distributed between "equal" and "protection. "
Yet matters take on a different aspect when we deal with the dis
tribution of government benefits through state run firms in competi
tive markets. We need in these cases a benchmark to decide what is
and is not appropriate behavior. All too often the tendency in dealing
with matters of race is to decry the use of private law analogies in set
ting out the standards in these cases. Kimberle Williams Crenshaw has
taken just that route when she argues that Lochner v. New York52 is
cut from the same cloth as is Plessy and should therefore be de
nounced for the same reasons we denounce Plessy.53 One obvious dif
ference between the two cases should give pause to that conclusion.
Plessy opted for a very broad definition of the police power, which al
lowed for the separation of the races on the supposed grounds that it
would advance the purpose of racial harmony. Lochner, for its part,
hewed to a narrower definition of the police power to strike down a
state that prevented certain classes of bakers from working more than
ten hours per day on the ground that this ostensible safety statute was
really little more than a disguised labor law (i.e., an explicit anticom
petitive statute).
I cannot resist mentioning one obvious irony here. To the extent
that Plessy could be read (in modern terminology) to adopt a rational
basis standard for racial classification, every defender of affirmative
action should devoutly wish that it were the authoritative decision in
52. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
53. Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Address at the Michigan Law Review Centennial
Celebration (Feb. 16, 2002).
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Gratz and Grutter. At this point the University of Michigan wins the
case in a walk. But this line of argument seems perverse if read to le
gitimate the actual legal outcomes in Plessy itself.
The key to the puzzle lies in setting the context for both Plessy and
Lochner. Both of these cases involved claims for state interference
with private organizational preferences. In both cases the state over
stepped its nightwatchman role, and in both cases its actions should
have been struck down. Lochner was right, and Plessy was wrong. But
our context is different. Here the state is acting as a market participant
not as a regulator. We still have to worry about the illicit use of state
power, but now we have a benchmark against which we can check its
action. Quite simply, we take as the measure of the reasonableness of
the state action the question of whether it follows the voluntary pat
terns and choices made by the private institutions with which it com
petes. Here, it is clear that no private institution will practice explicit
racial discrimination against blacks. We therefore do not have to
worry about the occasional ambiguity if some small but respectable
fraction of private institutions did follow this practice. Quite simply,
state institutions may be constrained to act within a narrower band of
reasonableness than private institutions. But no matter how that ques
tion is resolved, no state institution can adopt positions that are more
extreme than those of the private benchmarks against which its be
havior is judged. We do not have to embrace the alarmist position that
the acceptance of affirmative action programs opens the door to tradi
tional forms of race segregation in higher education. By the same to
ken, (notwithstanding the presence of the Civil Rights legislation) we
know that these organizations strongly endorse some practice of af
firmative action.
We may rest assured, moreover, that they reached these decisions
after they heard each and every argument that could be raised in de
fense of a color-blind principle in social life. These institutions are
fully aware of the limitations of standardized tests, for they rely on
them to choose applicants within separate cohorts. They understand
the danger of stigma that comes from the use of affirmative action
programs - and the danger of stigma that comes from their elimina
tion. (Stigma is one of those ubiquitous if elusive vices that can be
thrown up in the face of any social program, regardless of content or
motive, that addresses the problems of race.) They are fully aware that
it is more expensive to recruit and retain minority students in their
ranks. They know that the acceptance of minority students will neces
sarily displace white students with superior academic credentials. They
have figured out that you cannot get sufficient minority representation
into private and public universities by jiggering any set of race-neutral
standards in ways that maximize black representation. They under
stand that in some ways it is more difficult to teach classes in which
students come with widely different levels of academic skills. They
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know full well that remedial education for minority students (or in
deed all underprivileged students) has only an uncertain success rate.
They are aware that minority students finish on average lower in
classes, take longer to finish their degrees, and have a higher drop out
rate. They know that the aggressive recruitment of minority students
means that across the board, they have lower academic achievement
levels than their peers.
These findings are not news. In many cases these objections have
real bite. They may, and should, influence the resources devoted to af
firmative action programs. They may supply pointers as to how these
programs should be run; they may offer clues as to why some pro
grams succeed while others flounder. But throughout it all, the vast
bulk of private institutions of higher education in the United States
remain steadfast in their use affirmative action programs. Their public
competitors should have the same options available to them.
In my view, this point is critical to assess the constitutionality of the
overall system. I do not think that the Constitution should be read to
allow the state to meet the minimal standards in traditional rational
basis analysis in deciding on its racial practices. That lax standard
would allow a state to reinstitute programs of discrimination against
blacks even if no private organizations followed that pattern, contrary
to the position I have taken above. Nor do I think that this position
requires one to jettison Brown v. Board of Education54 in order to sal
vage modern affirmative action programs. Those programs could not
have survived in their traditional form if blacks had equal rights of
participation in the political process and were not subjected to the rein
of intimidation and terror, private and official, that characterized so
much of organized segregation in the Old South.
Yet none of those conditions apply today. Instead we can say with
some confidence that this case should be governed by a constitutional
variation of the business judgment rule. Members of boards of trus
tees, university presidents, provosts, deans, faculty, and students have
concluded through their internal deliberations that affirmative action
programs are an essential ingredient to their overall programs. No one
should override a private organization that takes that stand. Most leg
islators don't have the foggiest idea of how private universities are
run, and they should keep their hands out of the pie. In this regard, the
passage of Proposition 20955 in California represents just the wrong
approach because it seeks to impose a top-down, system-wide re
sponse, which only exposes the dangers of state monopolies. The hos
tile response from below shows just how unwise it was for the
California voters to adopt this form of command-and-control activi-

54. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
55. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 31 (adopted 1996).
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ties. Decentralized decisions, with minimal legislative intrusion, are
surely the order of the day. A similar vice, with similar drastic conse
quences follows from the passage of Title IX, dealing with sex dis
crimination in aid to higher education; its instant repeal is a good place
to reform federal policies. What is true of legislators is true of j udges
and justices (even those who come from academic backgrounds). They
could not run a university either, at least on the color-blind principles
that they could impose under a misplaced reading of the Equal
Protection Clause.
The question that remains is how far am I prepared to go with the
ideal of freedom of association. Thus one sensible challenge asks
whether or not I would allow state educational institutions to adopt an
explicit religious profile as say, a Baptist, Catholic or Jewish institu
tion. There is no question that such a decision would be regarded to
day as a per se violation of the Establishment Clause.56 Private univer
sities can fill this particular void. Public universities need not.
0
In my view sectarian public institutions of this sort should be re
garded as out of bounds. The question is how to distinguish this case
from that of affirmative action. Here I think that the best line of attack
is to note the three major approaches towards religion: separation, ac
commodation, and neutrality.57 None of these finds any place for state
run religious institutions, but they differ strongly in the way in which
they respond to religious activities in public universities. It is easy, too
easy, for the strict separationist to hold that no state university should
tolerate any religious activities on campus. That position strikes me as
untenable precisely because private secular universities all make place
for Christian, Jewish and Muslim organizations in their ranks, and re
gard themselves as the stronger for it. I am hard pressed to see why
public institutions have to be barren on matters of such evident impor
tance, especially in an age of identity politics. All in is far better than
all out.
But all in on what terms? In most cases that will require simply
neutrality, so that a university decision to fund nonreligious campus
magazines, for example, means that the state must also fund religious
magazines out of revenues drawn from all students.58 But this
nondiscrimination approach does not necessarily require a principle of
neutrality toward religion in all cases. Ever since the decision in

Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,59
56. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
57. For discussion, see Michael McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT.
REV. 1; Philip Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1
(1961) (advocating strict neutrality), and Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separa
tion and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43 (1997).
58. Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
59. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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which refused to make any accommodation for those who smoked
peyote only for religious purposes, strict neutrality has rightly been
under attack across the political spectrum.60 In this context, some ac
commodation should be made, as it routinely is, for men who wear
yarmulkes or women who for religious reasons will not shake hands
with men (as on receipt of their degrees). The exact extent to which
accommodation tempers a belief in neutrality is one of the hardest
questions in the vexed law of religious liberty, but the details of that
tradeoff need not bother us here. All that we need do is affirm the
view that inclusion of all religious life on campus is part of the picture,
while leaving it to a later day to work out the details on how it should
be done.
Stated otherwise, the current practices on religion within the uni
versity seem to recognize the difference between the state in its role as
nightwatchman and the state in its role as provider of goods and ser
vices. There is no real demand for public institutions to adopt explicit
religious postures. There is no need in a public university to tolerate
the exclusion of members of other religious groups. The establishment
clause has much more direct bite than the equal protection clause, and
any justification for deviation from that principle seems quite weak
given the wide range of faiths and religions from which public univer
sities draw. Their varying needs can be met by sensible open access for
all that makes, at the edges, appropriate accommodations for first this
group, and then that one.61 The matter is not free from doubt of
course. It is also possible to take the position that we should allow
these religious campuses to develop under state auspices because the
diffusion of political power is such that no one faith would get to run
all such campuses. But I think that the risk of serious social dislocation
is large enough relative to the dubious gains that are generated that
we should leave well enough alone on this front. The rules on religious
activities in public universities can stay more or less where they are.
It is useful to sum up: public institutions of higher education are in
close competition with private institutions of higher education. It sim
ply defies imagination (to lapse into Scalia-like excesses)62 to think
that they should be disabled from adopting and following the same
strategies as their private competitors on affirmative action questions.

60. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down the Religious Free
dom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1 to - 4 (1994)). I think that Boerne was correctly
decided insofar as it affirmed the dominance of the Court over Congress in setting constitu
tional standards. But that is only one reason why Smith should be overruled.
61. Thus the believer in strict neutrality would allow a prohibition on all headgear if
done for nonreligious reasons. But surely an accommodation that allowed religious headgear
should be allowed in classes absent some clear showing as to why it is inappropriate. But
these details do not influence the general point here.
62. For typical examples, see Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rhetoric of Constitutional Law,
100 MICH. L. REV. 2008 (2002) (this issue).
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For these purposes, they should be regarded as voluntary associations,
and as such be protected against constitutional attack precisely be
cause they are seeking to implement the principle of freedom of asso
ciation within the public sphere. Think back to the tests for using the
strict scrutiny in the first place. Here we have a powerful independent
check, which explains why affirmative action programs are adopted.
Private institutions of all sorts and stripes use them. The state universi
ties that adopt them are not dominated by one narrow group. The po
litical constellation of forces looks exactly like that which inspired
(wrongly in my view) the rational basis test for the state regulation of
private actors. The story on substance is much the same.

Dialogue
There is one question that remains. How will various universities
seek to manage the question of affirmative action if and when the
Supreme Court decides that it is best to allow business as usual to pro
ceed without the cloud of constitutional invalidation? In my view, it
should improve the situation. One great vice of the current debate is
how it polarizes positions. There is no give whatsoever in the color
blind position. Race has to be ignored in all ways and at all times. Any
deviation from the principle becomes a mortal sin. But oddly enough,
the situation is scarcely better if we switch to the other side and pro
claim that the case for affirmative action is so compelling that it meets
the strict scrutiny standard set up under the equal protection clause.
Let that be the case, and how can any hardy soul argue against the
principle in practice? Is it really tenable to take a public position to
eliminate or even restrict a program that the Supreme Court has found
to be a high social imperative?
These two extreme positions create a battle of the titans. But un
fortunately, they drag down everyone who hopes to adopt some mod
erate position to the ever-momentous problems of race. But the social
success in dealing with the race issue in America depends on our abil
ity to defuse the passions that the topic so typically raises. No sensible
administrator in a regulation-free world would ever wish to debate af
firmative action in the grandiose terms that dominate public discourse.
Rather, the only strategy that works is one that adopts some position
more favorable to affirmative action than its staunchest opponents
would allow, but less favorable to its invocation than its faithful sup
porters demand. At every point, the grand debate is put into the back
ground so that smaller issues can prevail. How do this year's numbers
look relative to last year's? What is the relative strength of the differ
ent groups in the pool? What is the public reputation of the school?
What is the position of the alumni? How does the affirmative action
program tie in or relate to other initiatives in the institution? At each
juncture, the key is to make those incremental adjustments in the pro-
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gram in order to achieve what are in the end only incremental im
provements. Affirmative action becomes a management priority: get
through this year with good relations and trust, and then try to do a bit
better next year. I can of course give no concrete advice to the
University of Michigan on how it should configure its program unless asked. But I do have advice for those who are sure that they
know how to run the venture from afar. Cool it on the big think. Small
steps do best, in an environment that is free of constitutional impedi
ments.

